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Signi¯cant horse races taking place in Britain and France frequently involve partici-
pants from both countries. The existence of distinct and segmented wagering markets in
each country facilitates the study of potentially di®erent market behaviors. Using over
eight hundred observations from these markets, I show the existence of a pronounced
home bias, with participants in domestic markets favoring horses trained domestically.
The bias is large, statistically signi¯cant, and becomes more pronounced as betting odds
rise. Restricting the analysis to foreign trained horses that have already performed well
in domestic races, I ¯nd the bias virtually disappears|suggesting a role for learning and
informational asymmetries.
¤I thank members of the Trinity brown bag series for helpful comments. Email: scanlop@tcd.ie1
Introduction
This goal of this paper is to address the issue of home bias in a prediction market. Predic-
tion markets are simple, and represent textbook markets in a complete set of Arrow-Debreu
securities. To analyze the issue of home bias, they are especially useful: the hedging against
aggregate risk is not a motivation, while the purchase of a foreign originated security entails
no transaction costs or foreign exchange rate risk. For these reasons, one can examine peoples'
relative demands for local and foreign assets, while controlling for many candidate explanations
for home bias.
To address this issue, this paper determines whether home bias exists in betting markets
for thoroughbred horse races. Over the past decade thoroughbred horse racing has increasingly
become an international a®air, with many races attracting participants from foreign countries.
Yet largely because of regulatory barriers and historical precedent, di®erent wagering markets
exist within each country, where people can wager on the outcome of the same race. Because
of transactions costs, legal barriers, and uncertainty about ¯nal prices, arbitrage across these
markets is di±cult.
Such market segmentation provides a way to examine the demands of market participants
for \assets" originating from di®erent countries. For instance, how much do French market
participants wager on British horses running in France, and vice versa? Because any vari-
ations in demand show up in price di®erentials across markets, price comparisons provide a
straightforward way to answer such questions.
Selecting a particular horse in these markets entails a similar analysis to choosing amongst
di®erent equities; central to both choices, for example, is an examination of past performance
and potential. Information about prospective runners is widely available. Professional services,
together with specially designated TV channels and newspapers all provide relevant and timely
information. Although the markets concerned are not as liquid as equity and bond markets,
the sums involved are signi¯cant and exceed those in standard experimental studies. Moreover,
in contrast to, say, international football matches, national sentiment and patriotism are less
likely to a®ect prices.
In this paper, I compare market prices from wagering markets in Britain and France. These2
countries have the largest racing industries and the most liquid and developed wagering mar-
kets. To ensure markets are su±ciently liquid, I focus on relatively signi¯cant races, where
there is more prize money and attract better class horses. Despite this, the vast majority of
races I examine are not well-known to the general public and therefore less likely to attract
interest from casual, once-o® participants. Using data from 2004-2011 and focusing primarily
on French horses running in Britain and British horses running in France, I examine the extent
of home bias in both markets. Despite presenting a natural forum to examine home bias, to
my knowledge this is the ¯rst paper to analyze home bias in the context of horse racing.
In Section 1, I present necessary background information on the relevant markets. Section
2 presents the two main empirical ¯ndings of the paper. First, there is a pronounced home
bias within local betting markets. Second, the bias attenuates as foreign-based horses run
well in domestic races and subsequently return to run again. Section 3 presents more informal
evidence on the existence of a home bias in other international markets. After brie°y discussing
particularly strong cases of the bias, I discuss implications of the analysis in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
1 Background
In France, most market participants wager through the state-run pari-mutuel (henceforth
PMU) market. This company has 6.5 million customers and annual turnover of approximately
10 billion euros. The average weekend race in France attracts a total wagering pool of between
200-320 thousand euros. In this system of parimutuel betting, all wagers enter a pool and,
after commission, the pool is divided amongst the winners. Within this system, people remain
unaware of the ultimate odds or payo® until the end of wagering. Although updates on odds
are available throughout the wagering, in practice most signi¯cant wagering takes place in the
minutes preceding each race. Together with commission, this inherent uncertainty makes risk-
free arbitrage impossible. Moreover, a large wager could depress the price so much as to render
the arbitrage operation self-defeating.1
Because of recent deregulation, a number of new online parimutuel markets have entered the
1This is especially the case for overlooked horses in the market.3
French market. One prominent example is Zeturf, which commits to lower commission than the
PMU. Yet because of historical precedent and the ubiquity of locations where one can wager
with them, the PMU remains the largest market in France.
In Britain, a similar state run parimutuel market exists, but in contrast to France, relatively
few use this market. In the historically more liberalized British market, most people wager
through high street bookmarkers and a large online betting exchange, Betfair. Bookmakers
individually create markets and adjust prices themselves in the face of °uctuations in demand.
By contrast, in a betting exchange, participants o®er and take bets from each other. In practice,
this market is highly liquid and attracts more sophisticated participants. Yet Betfair failed to
acquire a license to operate in France. For our purposes, an important issue is the commingling
of pools: for races in Britain, the pooling of French and British parimutuel markets is common
for signi¯cant races.
In all of the aforementioned markets, most signi¯cant wagering is conducted close to the
start of the race. Ultimately, market e±ciency dictates that the ¯nal odds in all wagering
systems relate directly to the probability of success for each horse. Most studies of racetrack
betting con¯rm this to be the case.
2 Data
To compare market behaviors across countries, I seek markets where the majority of participants
reside in a speci¯c country. For French races, I compare ¯nal prices from Betfair and prices from
both the PMU. Yet because of the pooling of the British and French parimutuel markets, for
British based races, I compare prices from Betfair and Zeturf. Data on all markets is available
from 2004-2011 and comes from Group 1 and Group 2 °at races. While Group 1 races are the
most prestigious races, both categories of race are highly competitive and attract better class
horses.
Because of superior prize money, more British horses travel to France, than French horses
to Britain. As a result, there is more date relating to British horses running in France, and
analysis of this data comprises the bulk of the study. After removing prospective outliers|
horses whose odds exceed 40 to one on any market|I have 677 observations on this margin. Of4
these, 235 observations represent horses who have already run in France. From these, I isolate
observations who have previously performed well in France: they have come in the ¯rst three
in similar class races over the past year, or have already won a French Group 1 race at any
stage. Regarding French horses running in British races, there are 141 observations over this
period with few repeat observations. For the empirical work, I analyze odds in decimal form.
This incorporates the return of a unit stake; for example, odds of 3 represent more contentional
odds of two to one.
Tables 1{4 illustrate the analysis of the larger sample of British trained horses running in
France. Table 1 presents a simple regression of PMU odds on Betfair odds using all observations.
Because both markets are pricing the same outcome, market e±ciency dictates and intercept
of zero and a coe±cient of one. Yet the coe±cient of 1:27 is signi¯cant at 1%, as is the positive
intercept. As a result, the PMU odds exceed the Betfair ones. For example, a horse with odds
of ¯ve to one on Betfair will be approximately eight to one in France.
Examining the prices of repeat observations is one way of determining whether French market
participants take account of previous form. In particular, how do French market participants
react to a British horse what has already run well in France? To address this, Table 2 presents
a similar regression to Table 1, but now includes dummy variable representing good perfor-
mance in a previous French race. The dummy is negative and highly signi¯cant, showing the
incorporation of information into prices. By comparison with the previous example, a horse
who has already run well in France with odds of ¯ve to one on Betfair will now have odds of
approximately ¯ve to one on the PMU. Indeed for odds below ¯ve to one, the horse will go o®
at a lower price on the PMU. By contrast, a horse who has previously performed poorly|and
presumably gone unnoticed|or who has never run in France will have odds of almost nine to
one on the PMU. Table 3 restricts the same regression to those horses who have already run in
France: a similar situation applies.
Table 4 performs the regression for horses whose odds are less than ¯ve to one on Betfair|
all horses with reasonably good chances of success. In this case, the dummy variable is still
highly signi¯cant. The French market remains wary of reasonably good horses who still haven't
performed on French soil.
The second part of the analysis compares prices of French horses running in Britain. Table 55
shows the result of a regression of Betfair odds on Zeturf odds. Continuing previous examples,
a horse that is ¯ve to one in France will go o® at around six to one in Britain. Table 6 restricts
the above regression to horses where Betfair odds exceed ¯ve to one; that is, these horses have
relatively low chances of winning. According to this regression, a horse of ¯ve to one in France
will have odds of approximately nine to one in Britain. Comparing this with Table 5, we see
the home bias is larger and becomes more pronounced when a horse is relatively unfancied.
Finally, to formally test equality of prices, I perform a signed Wilcoxon rank test for both parts
of the analysis. Although not shown, the test rejects equality of odds in both cases.
3 Other Evidence
Although this study has focussed on British and French races, an interesting question is whether
the bias exists in other international wagering markets. To address this informally, I examine
data from the last three most internationally contested races in Britain: the Golden Jubilee race
run at Royal Ascot in 2010, the July Cup in 2010, and the Kings Stand Stakes at Royal Ascot in
2011. The virtue of this exercise is the wide international participation from across the world,
and the existence of four local separate markets for each race. Tables 6|8 present odds from
these races from markets in Australia, Britain, France, and Hong Kong. Consistent with the
regression results, a signi¯cant home bias is evident|in most cases, the odds for domestically
trained horses are shortest in the domestic market.
Perhaps the most striking example of home bias in racing is the 2006 Prix de l'Arc De
Triomphe|the most famous European horse race. Here a Japanese horse, Deep Impact, who
had won all of his previous races, was widely supported in the betting by a large contingent
of Japanese traveling to France. The weight of Japanese support|who could not wager on
this race in Japan|attracted total wagers of 1.6 million euros (out of a pool of 2.9 million),
causing the horse to go o® at odds of 1 to 2. Such odds were widely regarded to overestimate
the success of Deep Impact, who went o® at approximately 2 to 1 on Betfair|four times higher
than the PMU. In the most recent running of the race in 2011, a German horse, Danedream,
won and again attracted little attention in British or French markets.2 This is despite the
2A daily British racing newspaper, the Racing Post, quoted a representative from a large bookmer, William
Hill: \This is the greatest Arc result for bookies in modern memory. Our guys were keen to keep Danedream6
fact Danedream previously won two Group 1 races in German in 2011. In Britain, France,
and German, the starting odds of 38, 28, and 18 respectively. Another recent example is the
success of a French horse Mak¯, in the British 2000 Guineas in 2010. Despite easily winning
its previous race in France, Mak¯ went o® at odds of 64 on Betfair and 12 on the PMU.3
Overall, this evidence suggests that home bias can manifest itself in large liquid markets that
attract considerable attention. The ¯nal point refers to learning. In subsequent races, British
bookmakers made Mak¯ and Danedream favorites for their next races.
4 Discussion
The existence of di®erent prices for the same asset indicates a market ine±ciency in the sense
that both prices cannot be re°ecting the same information. Because of the nature of parimutuel
markets and the relatively large commission, however, whether one can pro¯t from such price
discrepancies is unclear.
What is driving the bias? Two possible explanations are plausible: informational frictions
or a behavioral explanation such as overoptimism or familiarity bias.
In contrast to equity markets, the termination and repetition of wagering markets|where
horses run in subsequent races|provides one way to disentangle both theories. The fact that
that the bias diminishes for horses who have previously run well suggests markets incorporate
salient information. By contrast, if locals were inherently patriotic or over con¯dent about
domestically trained horses, the bias would show little tendency to diminish. Yet it does.
The fact the bias is largest for horses with lower chances of success suggests that locals are
especially wary of purchasing a foreign originated asset that presumably receives little publicity
or attention. This again points to an informational friction. Furthermore, the empirical analysis
shows that a home bias remains for poorly performing horses who run repeatedly. As a result,
familiarity fails to reduce the bias.
The analysis suggests a role for informational frictions. On the face of it, this is unsurprising.
onside and punters just weren't interested, with only one per cent of the money ¯elded for the German ¯lly.
3In this case, the PMU was pooled with the British parimutuel market. Because the British pool is not
widely used in Britain, French participants have a disproportionate e®ect on it. Discussing a similar happening,
a 2010 report in the Belfast Telegraph notes \the 1,000 Guineas win pool had a total of 151,000 pounds, 37,000
of which was on the 9-2 favorite made up of 28,000 from the French system (PMU). She paid only 3.50 on the
tote|equivalent to a ¯nal price of 5-2 for the win."7
As in equity markets, agents face a large number of options in a typical horse race. Careful
analysis of each option is costly in terms of time and money. Faced with this prospect and only
a marginally higher chance of success, the rational choice might be simply to incorporate the
most salient information. In the context of markets in this study, that is simply information
about domestic horses and foreign horses of proven ability. In a paper addressing interstate
arbitrage across betting markets in U.S. states, Hausch and Zimba (1990) note regional biases.4
Although that paper is not concerned with home bias per se, this evidence suggests a role for
informational issues and undermines the role of patriotism in driving home bias. This ¯nding
is similar in spirit to that of Coval and Moskowitz (1999), who show the existence of a home
bias at a local level: local investors invest disproportionately in local ¯rms.
5 Conclusion
This paper highlights the existence of a home bias in a simple market for contingent claims.
It shows a home bias exists in the absence of issues particular to the international economy.
That is, it exists in an environment with no aggregate or exchange rate risk and no additional
transactions costs to purchasing foreign assets. The fact that i) the bias diminishes after the
revelation of information and ii) the bias is most pronounced for horses who presumably receive
less media attention suggests information issues play a role in explaining the results. Overall,
therefore, the study provides suggestive evidence that informational frictions play a potentially
important role in explaining home bias in ¯nancial markets.
4For example, they note that in the 1986 Kentucky Derby, the winner Ferdinand paid 16.8 for 2 dollars at
Hollywood Park in California, where he was a regular race participant. Meanwhile, he paid 37.4 at Aqueduct
Part in New York, 79.6 at Woodbine in Toronto, and 90 at Evangeline in Louisiana.8


































































UK FR Aus HK
UK 7 13 7.7 10
UK 27 40 36 54
FR 12.7 7:7 18.2 27
FR 13.7 16 25 26
FR 35.7 23 58 67
FR 119 14:1 115 68
AUS 6.8 7.3 4:7 8.2
AUS 59.5 30 32 18
AUS 75.6 119 16 86
HK 10.2 14.1 6.6 2:4
USA 8.5 10 11.3 13
Table 7: Odds from the Golden Jubilee at Royal Ascot, June 2010. The top
column indicates the respective betting market, while the left hand column
shows representatives from each country.
Horse UK FR Aus HK
UK 3:8 7.2 5.7 3.5
UK 17 20 20 21
FR 19.6 16 23 23
FR 16.2 15 19 25
AUS 3.2 2.3 2:9 3.3
AUS 9 16 5:4 12
AUS 111 95 29 80
Table 8: Odds from the Darley Cup, July 201012
Horse UK FR Aus HK
UK 6:2 16.3 14.1 19
UK 5:6 8.1 7.2 8.7
FR 15.0 16:8 13.8 19
FR 43.0 34:7 72.1 59.0
AUS 6.8 4.4 3:7 3.7
HK 24.1 26.5 12.1 7:7
Table 9: Odds from the King's Stand Stakes, Royal Ascot, June 2011
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